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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant challenges the District Court's ruling that 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company ("Nationwide") was 
not required to make payment of uninsured benefits to or 
on behalf of appellant in excess of the $25,000 amount 
stated in the policy limits after an earlier named insured 
under the policy, her former husband, had elected that 
amount in writing. An understanding of the facts is 
necessary to our discussion. 
 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 
Appellant Rosetta Buffetta (also referred to as Rosetta 
Miriello) was married to Saverio Buffetta in August 1979. In 
1981, Mr. Buffetta obtained an automobile insurance 
policy, No. 5837B93654, from Nationwide. Sometime 
thereafter, appellant Rosetta Buffetta became a licensed 
driver and was added to the policy as such. However, from 
1981 to 1994, Mr. Buffetta was the sole named insu red 
under the policy. The initial limits of liability under the 
policy were $25,000/$50,000 for bodily injury and 
$25,000/$50,000 for uninsured motorist coverage. 
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The parties have stipulated to several of the important 
facts, and we recite them verbatim:1 
 
       By the terms of a Property Settlement Agreement dated 
       August 8, 1994, Saverio Buffetta retained the 
       automobile insured under the Nationwide Mutual 
       Insurance Company policy. 
 
       In October 1994, Rosetta Buffetta filed for divorce from 
       Saverio Buffetta. On October 22, 1994, Saverio 
       Buffetta requested a change in the liability limits of 
       coverage of the Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company 
       policy from $25,000.00/$50,000.00 to $100,000.00/ 
       $300,000.00. On October 22, 1994, Saverio Buffetta 
       signed and dated an Uninsured Motorist Coverage 
       Authorization Form electing to continue and maintain 
       the $25,000.00/$50,000.00 uninsured motorist 
       coverage limit. Effective October 22, 1994, the coverage 
       limits on the policy issued by the Nationwide Mutual 
       Insurance Company were $100,000.00/$300,000.00 in 
       liability coverage and $25,000.00/$50,000.00 in 
       uninsured motorist coverage. 
 
       Following the filing of the divorce and the entry of 
       same, Saverio Buffetta and Rosetta Buffetta continued 
       to live at 2343 S. Carlisle Street, Philadelphia, 
       Pennsylvania. Saverio Buffetta and Rosetta Buffetta 
       were divorced March 1, 1995. Saverio Buffetta 
       continued to live at 2343 S. Carlisle Street, 
       Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, until he moved to Italy in 
       1995. Rosetta Buffetta continues to live at 2343 S. 
       Carlisle Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
 
       Prior to moving to Italy, Saverio Buffetta transferred 
       title of the automobile insured under the Nationwide 
       Mutual Insurance Company policy to Rosetta Buffetta. 
       The named insured/policyholder identified on the 
       declarations pages of the Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
       Company policy from October 22, 1981 until July  10, 
       1995 was Saverio Buffetta. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The factual narrative is reproduced from paragraphs 12 through 31 of 
the Stipulation of Facts submitted in the District Court, reprinted at 
pages 23a-25a of the Appendix. 
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       Upon taking title to the car, Rosetta Buffetta notified 
       the Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company of the 
       divorce and requested that the policy be placed in her 
       name. Effective July 10, 1995, the named 
       insured/policyholder identified on the declaration 
       pages of the Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company 
       policy was changed to Rosetta Buffetta. Effective 
       July 14, 1995, the underwriting/rating status of 
       Rosetta Buffetta was changed from married to 
       unmarried. 
 
       Rosetta Buffetta never signed any written authorization 
       requesting uninsured motorist limits lower than bodily 
       injury limits. J. Ferullo was the Nationwide agent who 
       handled all changes and endorsement to the Policy in 
       1994 and 1995. Mr. Ferullo is deceased and 
       unavailable to provide any testimony regarding this 
       matter. 
 
       On February 14, 1997, Francesco Miriello sustained 
       fatal injuries in a motor vehicle accident. The motor 
       vehicle which struck Francesco Miriello was uninsured. 
       At the time of the accident, Francesco Miriello resided 
       with his daughter, Rosetta Buffetta. Following the 
       accident in question, the Estate of Francesco Miriello 
       made claim upon the Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
       Company for recovery of uninsured motorist benefits. 
 
Buffetta contends that Nationwide's liability for 
uninsured motorist coverage under the policy should not be 
limited to $25,000, because she never executed a writing 
for that amount, which is $75,000 less than her $100,000 
coverage for bodily injury. She contends that section 1734 
of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility 
Law ("MVFRL") requires her, a "named insured," to have 
signed a written reduction authorization and that, since she 
never signed such a written authorization, the policy must 
be "reformed" so as to permit the same limits for uninsured 
motorist coverage as for bodily injury. 
 
Nationwide, on the other hand, contends that there can 
be no reformation because the applicable statutory 
provision does not provide a remedy for violation of its 
provisions. Nationwide also argues that the statute has 
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been complied with because a written authorization for the 
reduction of the uninsured motorist coverage had been 
executed by the "named insured" of the policy, namely, Mr. 
Buffetta.2 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this action based 
upon 28 U.S.C. SS 2201 and 1332(a). Nationwide is a 
foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of 
Ohio. Ms. Buffetta resides in Pennsylvania. We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal based upon 28 U.S.C.S 1291. 
 
The District Court, exercising diversity jurisdiction in this 
declaratory judgment action, was obliged to apply the 
substantive law of Pennsylvania. See Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938). Because there was no 
reported decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or 
any other Pennsylvania court addressing the precise issue 
before it, it was the duty of the District Court to predict 
how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would interpret 
section 1734 of the Pennsylvania MVFRL if presented with 
this case. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. 
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1167 (3d Cir. 1981). 
In so doing, a federal court can also give due regard, but 
not conclusive effect, to the decisional law of lower state 
courts. See, e.g., Burke v. Maassen, 904 F.2d 178, 182 (3d 
Cir. 1990). The opinions of intermediate appellate state 
courts are "not to be disregarded by a federal court unless 
it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest 
court of the state would decide otherwise." West v. AT&T 
Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940). 
 
We exercise plenary review over the District Court's 
prediction of Pennsylvania law. See, e.g., Companie des 
Bauxites de Guinee v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 724 F.2d 
369, 371-72 (3d Cir. 1983). In predicting how the highest 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We note that amicus curiae briefs were filed in support of the position 
of appellant by the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association, and in 
support of the position of appellee by the Pennsylvania Defense Institute. 
Since they echo essentially the same arguments made by the parties, we 
will not specifically comment on or refer to their submissions. 
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court of the state would resolve the issue, we must consider 
"relevant state precedents, analogous decisions, considered 
dicta, scholarly works, and any other reliable data tending 
convincingly to show how the highest court in the state 
would decide the issue at hand." McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. 




The District Court framed the issue before it as follows: 
 
       Does the failure of the insurer to obtain new uninsured 
       motorist election forms upon the change of the named 
       insured from the husband to the wife following divorce 
       require the reformation of the uninsured motorist 
       coverage limits to the higher liability limits of coverage? 
 
Opinion, September 20, 1999, at 2. 
 
The District Court recited the facts relevant to its 
discussion, emphasizing Mrs. Buffetta's conduct af ter the 
policy was changed to her name: 
 
       Nationwide was requested to maintain the same policy 
       for the same vehicle at the same address, but with 
       Rosetta Buffetta now listed as the named insured. She 
       continued to receive billings with coverage listings. She 
       paid the premiums and the policy was renewed at least 
       three times before the accident. At no time did Rosetta 
       Buffetta request any coverage changes. 
 
Id. at 2-3. 
 
The District Court noted that the provisions of the 
MVFRL relating to the waiver of uninsured motorist ("UIM") 
coverage, and reduction in coverage amounts, were 
amended in 1990. The previous provisions had provided 
that, without a written election, UIM coverage limits would 
automatically default to the higher liability limits. The 1990 
amendments, however, made only the failure to comply 
with the requirements for total waiver of UIM coverage 
subject to an automatic default provision, without providing 
any automatic default or remedy in the section providing 
for reduction of UIM coverage amounts. The statutory 
provisions regarding total waiver of UIM coverage, and 
reduction in coverage, now read as follows: 
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       (c.1) Forms of waiver. -- Insurers will print the 
       rejection forms required by subsections (b) and (c) on 
       separate sheets in prominent type and location. The 
       forms must be signed by the first named insured and 
       dated to be valid. The signatures on the form may be 
       witnessed by an insurance agent or broker. Any 
       rejection form that does not specifically comply with 
       this section is void. If the insurer fails to produce a 
       valid rejection form, uninsured or underinsured 
       coverage, or both, as the case may be, under that policy 
       will be equal to the bodily injury liability limits . On 
       policies in which either uninsured or underinsured 
       coverage has been rejected, the policy renewals must 
       contain notice in prominent type that the policy does 
       not provide protection against damages caused by 
       uninsured or underinsured motorists. Any person who 
       executes a waiver under a subsection (b) or (c) shall be 
       precluded from claiming liability of any person based 
       upon inadequate information. 
 
75 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 1731(c.1) (1996) (emphasis added). 
 
       Request for lower limits of coverage: 
       A named insured may request in writing the issuance 
       of coverages under section 1731 (relating to 
       availability, scope and amount of coverage) in amounts 
       equal to or less than the limits of liability for bodily 
       injury. 
 
Id. S 1734. 
 
The District Court examined section 1734 in light of the 
parties' arguments. Both parties characterized the issue as 
one of "reformation" of the policy so as to provide Rosetta 
Buffetta with $100,000 in uninsured motorist coverage 
rather than the $25,000 of coverage that had been 
authorized in writing by Mr. Buffetta. 
 
The District Court expressed skepticism as to its ability 
to reform the policy to the higher UIM limits absent a 
statutory provision to that effect. It noted that in Salazar v. 
Allstate Insurance Co., 702 A.2d 1038 (Pa. 1997), and 
Donnelly v. Bauer, 720 A.2d 447 (Pa. 1998), the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court construed certain notice 
provisions relating to UIM coverage and held that an 
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insured could not obtain reformation of coverage unless the 
MVFRL specifically provided that remedy. The District 
Court noted that, while the Pennsylvania legislature 
provided that a total waiver of uninsured motorist coverage 
would be ineffective in the absence of a valid rejection form 
and would automatically default to the bodily injury limits 
-- thus providing a remedy in that situation -- the 
statutory section applicable to the instant situation, 
namely, section 1734, contains no such remedy. However, 
the District Court did not resolve the matter on this basis, 
but proceeded to address Nationwide's other argument: that 
there had been no violation of section 1734 because the 
section only requires a written authorization request for the 
lower UIM limits, and Saverio Buffetta, a named insured, 
had signed such an authorization form. The District Court 
credited this argument, concluding: 
 
       I find that the change which actually listed her on the 
       declaration pages after the divorce did not require a 
       new election of coverage to be signed in order to 
       continue the same policy coverage. As in the case of 
       Kimball v. Cigna Ins. Co., 660 A.2d 1386 (Pa. Super. 
       1995), Rosetta Miriello Buffetta was initially listed as a 
       driver under the policy. Under the policy terms, she 
       enjoyed the same status as a named insured. Saverio 
       Buffetta was initially the named insured on the policy 
       when he elected, in writing, the lower limits of 
       uninsured motorist coverage. When Rosetta Miriello 
       Buffetta assumed the policy and became the listed 
       insured, she took no steps to change the policy 
       provisions for more than three years. During that time, 
       she received premium and overage notices and paid 
       premiums every six months. In doing so, she 
       acquiesced in the coverage that had been selected. 
 
Opinion, at 6. 
 
We will affirm the District Court's order essentially for the 
reasons stated therein.3 We note that while the issue of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We note, while not necessary to our ruling, that we do not subscribe 
to the District Court's view that Ms. Buffetta enj oyed "named insured" 
status when she was merely a driver under the policy. The policy clearly 
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"reformation" of the policy is implicated by the parties' 
arguments and that the pronouncements of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court on this issue appear to favor 
Nationwide's position, we agree with the District Court's 
analysis that there was no section 1734 violation, and thus 
we need not add our voice to the ongoing discussion of 
policy reformation in the Pennsylvania courts.4 We base our 
affirmance on the unique set of facts presented and the 
absence in the statutory language of any requirement for a 
new written authorization to be submitted by Ms.  Buffetta 
in this factual setting. 
 
We start with the statutory language we have quoted 
above. The statute, by its terms, does not require anything 
to be done by an insurer to permit the reduction  in the 
amount of UIM coverage under a policy. Rather, section 
1734 provides that "a named insured may request in 
writing the issuance of coverages . . . in amounts equal to 
or less than the limits of the liability for bodily injury." 
Unlike section 1731, section 1734 does not dictate that the 
opportunity for reduction, or a form to that effect, be 
presented when a policy is issued. It merely provides that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
provides that she was an "insured," but she was not listed as a "named 
insured," and does not appear to even be a "policyholder," as defined. 
However, the policy was addressed to her insofar as coverage and other 
obligations are concerned, because she was included in the concept of 
"you" or "your" under the policy as spouse of the named insured. We 
view the District Court's statement as incorrect, but do not view it as 
pivotal to its, or our, reasoning or conclusion. 
 
4. Even as the parties were proceeding toward argument in this case, 
they provided us with an opinion of the Pennsylvania Superior Court, 
which in May determined that the absence of a remedy in the section 
before us, section 1734, prevents reformation, consistent with the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's rulings in Salazar  and Donnelly. See 
Lewis v. Erie Ins. Exch., 753 A.2d 839 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). In addition, 
the parties filed a motion jointly requesting that we certify to the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania the issue of whether there is a remedy 
for the alleged failure of the insurer to obtain an election of the lower 
limits of uninsured motorist coverage pursuant to section 1734 under 
the court's analysis in Donnelly and Salazar. Because our basis for 
affirmance does not involve resolution of that issue, we will decline to 
certify the issue as requested. 
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a reduction of this kind may be accomplished, but only by 
a writing which constitutes a request by a named insured. 
 
Interestingly, the case law that has developed regarding 
this section, which Ms. Buffetta relies upon, has arisen in 
a different context. In each case, the insurer has claimed 
that a reduction was authorized, but the argument has 
focused on whether there was in fact a signed writing that 
constituted a valid, effective request of a named insured for 
the reduction. In the instances in which the insured has 
been successful, it has been based upon the absence of a 
valid written request for reduced coverages signed by a 
named insured. See Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Resseguie, 980 
F.2d 226 (3d Cir. 1992) (no reduction where there was no 
written request signed by a named insured); Motorists Ins. 
Cos. v. Emig, 664 A.2d 559 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (agent's 
completion of form did not satisfy statutory requirement for 
written request of insured); Botsko v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 
620 A.2d 30 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (written request for lower 
coverage ineffective where no evidence that insured was 
advised of coverage mandated by statute before signing 
authorization in favor of lesser coverage). 
 
Here, there was a valid written request executed by 
Saverio Buffetta. The only issue is whether it is binding on 
Rosetta Buffetta. Given this setting, we agree with the 
District Court that the Pennsylvania Superior Court's ruling 
in Kimball v. Cigna Insurance Co., 660 A.2d 1386 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1995), provides the best insight into the 
probable resolution of this issue by the Pennsylvania 
courts. 
 
In Kimball, plaintiff was listed as a driver under her 
father's policy, but her mother was the only "named 
insured." Her mother executed a form reducing the 
uninsured motorist coverage limits in 1990. In 1991, 
plaintiff purchased a vehicle, and the "endorsement" 
portion of the policy added her as a "named insured." 
Plaintiff was injured by an uninsured motorist in 1992 and 
contended that she was not bound by the election that her 
mother had made for reduced coverage and that, when she 
was added to the policy after the election, she should have 
been informed as to the amount of coverage available and 
required to execute a written request for lower coverage 
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under section 1734. The Pennsylvania Superior Court cited 
authority from common pleas courts and federal court 
cases to the effect that one in plaintiff 's position was bound 
by the writing signed by another named insured. The court 
noted that one in plaintiff 's position, upon becoming a 
named insured and receiving an endorsement amending the 
policy that listed her as a named insured and indicated the 
amount of coverage, had an obligation to act: 
 
       At bar, albeit the plaintiff was not listed as a"named 
       insured" at the time her mother executed a "sign down" 
       form to reduce uninsured/underinsured coverage, she 
       was a "named insured" when the "endorsement" 
       amending the policy and listing her as a "named 
       insured" was received at the Kimball household. 
       Specifically, the amendment indicated in clear 
       language that the uninsured motorist coverage stood at 
       $100,000 and no higher. However, no action was taken 
       by the plaintiff to rectify this level of coverage. She 
       could have increased coverage under her mother's 
       policy (with accompanying premium increases) or 
       secured her own separate policy should her mother not 
       be amenable to the increased coverage and additional 
       cost associated therewith. The plaintiff took no action 
       on either front. 
 
       Moreover, the policy limits remained in effect for two 
       renewal periods without any effort on the plaintiff 's 
       part to increase coverage beyond the $100,000.00 limit 
       for uninsured/underinsured insurance. Rather, the 
       premiums (at the lower rate) continued to be paid 
       without question or complaint to the Cigna agent about 
       the level of coverage. Under this scenario, as is 
       consistent with 75 Pa. C.S.A. S 1791, the payment of 
       the renewal premiums (which here occurred at least 
       twice while the plaintiff was a "named insured") 
       evidences [the plaintiff 's] actual knowledge and 
       understanding of the availability of these benefits and 
       limits as well as the benefits and limits . . . selected. 
 
       Accordingly, if the plaintiff did not accept her 
       mother's election, upon receipt of the policy with the 
       lower limit and lower premiums, she could have 
       contacted the insurance company, informed them of 
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       the dissatisfaction with the amount of 
       uninsured/underinsured coverage and requested it be 
       corrected or obtained another policy on her own. 
       Instead, the plaintiff accepted the policy with the lower 
       limits without complaint and permitted payment of the 
       lower premium without incident. To find that the 
       plaintiff is not bound by her mother's election and 
       remaining silent on the issue of increased coverage, 
       while reaping the benefits of reduced rates, would be to 
       reward inaction. Here, the plaintiff had the means and 
       opportunity to avoid any insurance shortfall, but she 
       took no action to remedy the matter. 
 
Kimball, 660 A.2d at 1388-89. 
 
We realize that the issue before us is not precisely the 
situation in Kimball, but, drawing on the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court's repeated references to a later named 
insured's being bound by having understood the policy 
limits and acquiesced in them by paying lower premiums, 
we conclude that the instant factual setting is sufficiently 
analogous to Kimball to require the same result.5 Ms. 
Buffetta asked for the policy to be in her name and received 
notices referencing policy limits. She paid premiums based 
on those limits that were obviously less than if the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Interestingly, the reasoning of one of the cases relied upon by the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court could have led it to a different result 
(although not one that would follow here). In Groff v. Continental 
Insurance Co., 741 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Pa. 1990), Judge Huyett held that 
where one named insured had executed a reduction authorization, but 
the other had not, a third person insured under the policy, not a named 
insured, would be bound by the reduction. However, the court noted 
that a dilemma would be presented if the one actually claiming under 
the policy was one of the named insureds. See id. at 548-49. In Kimball, 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court did not concern itself at all with the 
fact that the plaintiff who was injured and was seeking to be relieved of 
the reduction was in fact a named insured who had not executed a form 
authorizing the reduction. Here, since the injury was to Ms. Buffetta's 
father, the Groff situation is presented. The court in Kimball also relied 
upon a case decided by the Court of Common Pleas of York County that 
references a "one policy, one coverage" reality, noting that if different 
insureds desire different coverages, they should opt to have separate 
policies. See Kimball, 660 A.2d at 1387-88 (discussing Liberty Mut. Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Lindsey, 3 Pa. D. & C.4th 659 (C.P. York County 1989)). 
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uninsured motorist coverage had been $100,000 instead of 
the stated $25,000. 
 
While we concede that a policy argument could be made 
to the effect that a new named insured should always have 
his or her voice count as to whether a reduced uninsured 
motorist coverage is requested, this is not evident in the 
statutory language, nor was it expressed in Kimball. As we 
noted above, the statute requires only that a waiver form be 
provided upon issuance of a policy. There is no  statutory 
requirement that an insured be given a reduction 
authorization form without the insured's having requested 
one. The statute is written in permissive terms, leaving it to 
a named insured, who "may" request reduced coverage. The 
option exists to request such a reduction and, we submit, 
Kimball was decided on the basis that a later named 
insured, upon being added to the policy, could have notified 
the insurance company that she did not want to be bound 
by another's election of reduced coverage. 
 
We also view the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
reasoning in its recent opinions in Salazar and Donnelly 
regarding the issue of "reformation" to support the way in 
which we approach the statute before us. Even where 
defendant insurance companies have violated the policy 
notice requirements of the Pennsylvania MVFRL, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has declined to provide a 
remedy for the insured by, for example, construing the 
policy against the insurer. Instead, the court has adhered 
strictly to the statutory language, and, where no remedy is 
provided, it has refused to create one. See Salazar, 702 
A.2d at 1044; Donnelly, 720 A.2d at 454. 6 As a federal court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Judge Caputo of the District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania recently examined the difference between the requirements 
for waiving, and for reducing, UIM coverage and noted this trend as well: 
 
       Recent decisions by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have 
       suggested an unwillingness on the part of the State's high court to 
       entertain statutory interpretations that depart from the letter of 
the 
       text, even where the plaintiff is left without redress for an 
injury 
       under the statute. 
 
Leymeister v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 100 F. Supp. 2d 269, 272 
n.3 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (citing and discussing Donnelly, 720 A.2d at 453-54, 
and Salazar, 702 A.2d at 1044). 
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sitting in diversity, we should be especially reluctant to 
create new rights that neither the state legislature nor the 
state courts have seen fit to recognize. See , e.g., Keystone 
Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 147 
(3d Cir. 1974) (noting that "our assigned role is to predict 
and not to form state law"). 
 
We note, in addition, that the Salazar and Donnelly 
opinions express concern for policies implicated by the 
issue before us, namely, the legislative concern over the 
increasing costs of automobile insurance, which the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Donnelly characterized as 
"the public policy which is to be advanced when 
interpreting the statutory provisions of the MVFRL." 
Donnelly, 720 A.2d at 452. In reasoning that it would not 
provide a remedy not specifically set forth in the MVFRL, 
the Donnelly court relied in part on policy considerations: 
 
       If this Court were to fashion a remedy not expressly 
       provided for in the MVFRL, this Court would 
       essentially contravene the cost containment policy 
       behind the MVFRL because allowing appellants the full 
       tort coverage they seek would result in giving appellant 
       something for which no individual has paid, which in 
       turn, would result in insurance companies passing on 
       this extra cost to all other insureds. 
 
Id. at 454. As we have noted, the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court in Kimball was similarly concerned, as we must be 
here, with this policy by ruling that the insured should 
receive the coverage for which she paid. 
 
Accordingly, we predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would hold that where the new named insured was 
covered by the existing policy when the written reduction 
was effected, and became a named insured with ample 
opportunity to alter the coverage under the policy, having 
received ongoing notice of the amount of coverage under 
her policy, and having paid premiums that took such 
coverage limits into account, she was bound by the 
coverage choices made by the previous named insured 
under the policy. 
 
Accordingly, we will AFFIRM the order of the District 
Court. 
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STAPLETON, J., dissenting: 
 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
In order to fashion a rational scheme from the 
Pennsylvania statutes pertaining to voluntary 
uninsured/under insured motorist coverage, I predict that 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would hold that 
"[u]nder 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 1731(a) (1997), the amount of 
UM coverage is automatically equal to the bodily injury of 
a policy unless the insured effectively exercises the option 
to lower or waive such coverage." Travelers Indem. Co. of 
Illinois v. DiBartolo, 171 F.3d 168, 170 (3d Cir. 1999). 
Further, I think it clear that in order for there to be an 
effective exercise of the option to lower the UM coverage, 
there must be a written request signed by "a named 
insured." 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 1734 (1999). The more 
difficult issue presented is how these principles would be 
applied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the factual 
setting of this case, one that must be quite common. 
 
Prior to July 10, 1995, Saverio Buffetta was the sole 
named insured under Nationwide's policy No. 5837B93654. 
While he was the named insured, he elected in writing to 
have UM coverage lower than his bodily injury limits. On 
July 10, 1995, he ceased to have any interest in the policy, 
and Rosetta Buffetta, having purchased a car from Saverio 
and having orally requested continuation of the insurance 
coverage on that vehicle, became the sole named insured. 
Because a central purpose of the statutory scheme is to 
focus the attention of a real party in interest on the issue 
of how much UM coverage should be secured, I believe the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would hold that Nationwide's 
responsibilities to Rosetta were the same as they would 
have been had she applied for a new policy, given that she 
signed neither a waiver nor a reduction form. I would hold 
that Rosetta's UM coverage is equal to her bodily injury 
coverage. 
 
I find this situation materially different from that involved 
in Kimball, where a daughter became an additional named 
insured on her mother's policy and her mother's earlier 
election of reduced UM coverage continued to be the 
effective UM coverage limits of the mother's policy. 
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